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General introduction 
      
     Cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries has changed considerably since the 
Yaoundé Agreements were signed in 1963 and it has given rise to a range of institutional 
innovations. These innovations result from the dynamics within the EU-ACP agreements but 
also from the development of a larger institutional framework incorporating the main 
international institutions (above all, the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT/WTO and the ILO) 
and developments in the international political and economic context. The major changes over 
the last 40 years at international, national and regional level have therefore led to 
modifications in both the need for development in the ACP countries and the offer of 
development from the EU. 
 
     As regards the EU/ACP dynamic, the institutional context has changed considerably since 
the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which marked the start of the European Community's  
multilateral development cooperation with developing countries or regions. In fact, the 
Community policy on development cooperation came about at the same time as the 
Community itself, with the creation of the first ever European Development Fund (EDF) in 
1958, although at this time several ACP countries were still colonies. In 1960, the wave of 
independence in the South resulted in the modification of the spatial and institutional 
framework of development cooperation. The Yaoundé I and Yaoundé II Conventions of 1963 
and 1969 respectively and then the Lomé Agreements that were renewed four times (Lomé I, 
Lomé II, Lomé III and Lomé IV, which expired on 29 February 2000) are some of the 
milestones in the history of development cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries. 
 
     The Yaoundé Agreements, which the ACP countries accused of strengthening neo-
colonialism by reproducing the division of labour set out in the colonial pact, were followed 
by the Lomé Agreements. These agreements too proved unsuitable in the face of the 
challenges of economic globalisation, the debt crisis, the impacts of structural adjustment 
programmes, the failure of previous development policies, the end of the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994) and the creation of the WTO in 1994 and the aftermath of the Cold War. The 
Cotonou Agreement, which was signed on 23 June 2000 by the EU and 77 ACP counties 
follows on from the previous agreements and aims to take account of the new rules of the 
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globalised economy in the cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries whilst, to the 
extent possible, preserving development cooperation, which is increasingly tending towards a 
simple free trade agreement as a result of the new international architecture.  
 
Trade liberalisation plays a key role in the new framework of development cooperation 
between the EU and the ACP countries, since it has to help to achieve objectives such as 
better growth, full employment, poverty reduction and the promotion of decent work. 
However, specific instruments - such as the new GSP and its special incentive for sustainable 
development and good governance, the GSP+ (2006-2008) – are also contained in 
Community trade policy to promote fundamental social rights. The objective of the Cotonou 
Agreements is not simply to generate sustainable growth that helps to reduce poverty in the 
ACP countries but also to make the formulation of development strategies more democratic, 
bring about good governance and better involve non-state actors. 
 
The overall objective of the report is to analyse the main challenges facing the trade union 
organisations that result from the new institutional framework established by the Cotonou 
Agreements and to pinpoint the associated risks and opportunities. The first part of the report 
deals with the new context within which the EPAs are gradually being set up. It will then go 
on to evaluate the major trends regarding democratic, social and economic changes at national 
and regional level, against the backdrop of which the Cotonou Agreements are gradually 
being implemented. This part focuses on macroeconomic indicators, regional integration, 
integration in a globalised economy, formal and informal employment, access to basic goods 
and services, good governance and democracy. The second part discusses the involvement of 
the trade union movement and workers' associations in defining and implementing the 
national development strategy (NDS). The third part of the report examines the access that the 
trade union organisations have to development cooperation resources. The fourth part 
provides an analysis of the challenges of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) for 
the trade union organisations. The final part evaluates the trade union organisations' needs for 
boosting their capacities.  
 
It should be noted that this report is intended to be read alongside a set of expert reports, 
which deal with the social and economic situation of each country analysed in the project in 
far more detail and provide a detailed analysis of the position of the trade union organisations 
as regards the EPAs. This report aims to extract the main elements that emerge from the 
country reports and to identify the basis for a guide to boost the capacities of the trade union 
organisations, as fully-fledged players in drawing up the development strategy. 
 
1 – Making poverty reduction a priority: the use of MDGs for development cooperation 
 
The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), drawn from the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration which was signed in 2000 by world leaders, marked the United 
Nations' return to the front line on development-related issues after these issues had been 
dominated for two decades by the Bretton Woods organisations (International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank). The Millennium Declaration rounded off a decade that saw the United 
Nations once again take initiative, which led to the organisation of an impressive series of 
world summits, above all the World Summit for Children in New York in 1990, the Earth 
Summit in Rio in 1992 and the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 
1995. The MDGs were the result of a major effort to relaunch the debate on development 
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strategies in order to include not just the logic of structural adjustment policies but also the 
human dimension (Lapeyre, 2006). 
The commitment made to achieve the MDGs by 2015 caused new measures to be set up in a 
bid to help the poor countries and the aid donors to boost the impact of their joint efforts to 
fight poverty. The new National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), which were drawn up in the 
framework of the Cotonou Agreements, and the generalisation of poverty reduction strategy 
papers (PRSPs), which largely define the development policy priorities of an increasing 
number of countries, draw on this immense effort focused on poverty reduction and the 
integration into the globalised economy. However, it should be noted that the awareness of 
the need to immediately tackle the most serious social and environmental problems - resulting 
for the most part from the rapid and abrupt change of the global economy – has not managed 
to call into question the neoliberal project to adapt national areas of responsibility to the 
standards of the globalised economy. The convergence towards these standards, in terms of 
competitiveness, flexibility and attractiveness for foreign investments, is still seen as an 
inevitable part of any sort of development. 
 
The primary objective of the MDGs is to reduce poverty and hunger in a world where 
1 billion people, who live on less than $1 a day, suffer from extreme poverty and 800 million 
people do not have enough do eat to satisfy their daily energy requirements (United Nations: 
2005). However, the issues of inequalities and employment that were at the centre of 
discussions on poverty reduction in the 1970s are missing from the MDGs. What is even 
worse is that, since development policies are becoming synonymous with poverty reduction 
policies, all considerations regarding redistribution can be ignored and the core nature of the 
growth objective is reaffirmed in the formulation of development policies, a move which is 
supported strongly by the dominant discourse 'growth helps the poor'. One of the perverse 
effects of this discourse, in which the improvement of living conditions depends on 
sustainable growth, is that it offers no concessions as regards the reform programmes required 
for successful integration into the globalised economy. 
2 – "You can't eat growth!": The place accorded to growth in development strategies in the 
ACP countries 
 
A project which has globalisation as its dominant discourse is a totalitarian project that closes 
the door to the plurality of possibilities. There is only one possible way of achieving growth 
and reducing poverty, which is to become integrated into the globalised economy. There are 
two levels of responsibility within the globalised economy: the responsibility of each country 
to adapt to the standards of globalisation and that of the new world order to guarantee better 
conditions for the accumulation of capital at global level by using the ability to intervene or 
impose sanctions in a bid to make those, who disrupt the world order on which the dynamic of 
globalisation is based, see sense. 
 
In the dominant discourse, the prospects for growth by becoming integrated into the 
globalised economy are available to all provided that they meet the requirements for 
accumulation in its globalised form. Only those countries that will firstly ensure an 
environment conducive to the arrival of transnational companies and secondly be capable of 
taking part in the new division of labour within the globalised economy, will be able to 
advance their economy. The other countries will have to review their policies and strategies so 
that they can understand where and how they can form a link with the emergent international 
production system (Lapeyre, 2003). 
 4 
Growth therefore no longer poses a problem if all measures are taken to become integrated 
into the globalised economy and if all resources are focused on these core high-performance 
activities. The development opportunities, which are available to all, depend on how well the 
country is opened up and how well it meets with the internationalisation standards. The neo-
liberal discourse on globalisation is one that heralds adaptation to globalisation and is based 
on the objectives of flexibility and competitiveness in relation to the standards of the 
globalised economy. 
 
The development strategy championed by the EU and by the Bretton Woods organisations is 
based on the hypothesis of the virtuous progression of liberalisation, growth and poverty 
reduction which would justify the prescriptive side of the dominant discourse and the priority 
accorded to liberalisation policies in structural adjustment policies. Growth helps the poor and 
liberalisation helps growth, this is the core of the new development strategies promoted by the 
IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the European Commission. 
 
The main challenge when breaking down this doctrine is to question the place accorded to 
growth in development policies. If the benefits of growth are shared fairly and if growth helps 
the poor, then a policy focused on promoting growth can be justified. If, on the other hand, 
the poor are excluded from the benefits of growth or receive proportionally less benefits than 
other groups in society, the objective of growth should be reincorporated into an integrated 
development strategy, in which growth is an important aspect but is given no more 
importance than the creation of productive jobs, the fairer distribution of income and the 
meeting of basic material and immaterial needs. 
 
In this respect, it should be noted that the developing countries in general and the LDCs in 
particular have made a considerable effort to open up their economies and adapt to the 
standards of globalisation, as part of their accession process to the WTO. The explanation 
provided by the World Bank referring to the lack of integration and the lack of policies of 
openness in the developing countries with a low level of economic growth, therefore seem 
overly simplistic. The problem is that these countries have received little thanks for their 
efforts. They have had to face up to an asymmetrical liberalisation process (countries in the 
North refusing to open up their agricultural markets) and to the problem of poor integration 
characterised by their dependency on exports of primary products (lack of diversity, low value 
added, high level of price fluctuation and unfavourable developments in terms of trade). Once 
again, the challenge is to gain the ability to control the speed and the sequence of an 
integration process whose overriding objective should be to improve the living and working 
conditions of the population and instead of to pursue liberalisation per se. 
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3 – Towards redefining the role of the people and their representative organisations in 
formulating the development strategy 
 
The recent report on civil society from the Secretary of the United Nations is a perfect 
example of the new dominant vision of development, based on the involvement of non-state 
actors and the promotion of public-private partnerships. The key idea is that advantage must 
be taken of the potential and existing synergies between the various players involved in 
development and that work must be undertaken to establish contact between the different 
stakeholders concerned by the same problem (United Nations, 2004). The dialogue that takes 
place when establishing objectives and defining the project, improves the project, makes it 
better adapted to reality and ensures it is in line with the development needs of the population. 
Moreover, redefining the roles and responsibilities between public (national or local) and 
private (private sector or civil society) players must make it possible to take account of a 
range of development needs submitted by players who were previously not entitled to have an 
input and also to improve the management of a whole range of basic services since "where 
capacity is devoted to multi-stakeholder processes, the pay-offs have been significant" 
(United Nations, 2004: 10). These new partnerships and participative frameworks are still a 
vital tool for development cooperation enabling innovate answers to be found to critical 
questions. The Millennium Development Goals have also had a catalysing effect for the 
partnerships in the field between the public authorities, the private sector and NGOs since 
concerted action at a variety of levels is essential if these Goals are to be met. 
 
The expansion of development cooperation to include a wide range of players, in particular 
civil society and local and parliamentary public authorities, is seen as "the opportunity to 
harness new capacities and diverse experience to address some of the most exacting 
challenges the world faces today" (Cardoso Commission, 2004: 7). The process for making 
development more democratic and opening it up to civil society went hand in hand with a 
huge process of decentralisation in the South that aimed to make the local public authorities 
into a stronger players in development. These authorities are still considered as important 
partners since they are most often the ones that play a key role at local level in areas vital for 
ensuring the living conditions of the population, for example water, sanitation and health and 
education services. 
 
The new world governance model must be created on the basis of promoting involvement and 
responsibility at all levels. However, the commitment of the stakeholders and the 
development of the partnerships require the capacities of civil society and private sector 
organisations to be boosted, compromise-building measures, including mechanisms for the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts, to be shored up and national and multinational civil 
servants to be trained to deal with a wider range of stakeholders. To achieve this, an 
institutional context needs to be created that is capable of creating these new partnerships and 
providing the various stakeholders with the means to act and better develop their potential. 
This new development paradigm offers genuine opportunities for the trade union 
organisations to claim a role as fully-fledged players in setting priorities for development 
policies.
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4 – The new measures for promoting involvement of non-state actors 
Decentralised cooperation, which was introduced into the framework of the Lomé IVbis 
Convention in 1989, constituted a new approach to development cooperation. The aim of this 
type of cooperation was to increase the number of cooperation players, which was usually 
fairly limited, by legitimising the role of decentralised agents in development (Fonteneau and 
Lapeyre, 1998). This cooperation differed in the fact that it offered support to initiatives 
coming directly from grass-roots level. The responsibility for establishing needs and for 
defining and implementing the project was passed to local players. Consequently, these local 
agents were no longer regarded as people simply benefiting from or implementing the 
projects, which were established upstream of them, but instead as people in charge of 
promoting the improvement in their living and working conditions. 
The role of decentralised cooperation as a new development cooperation instrument was 
reaffirmed in the Lomé IVbis Convention that states in Article 12a: "Recognising the 
potential for positive contributions by the agents of decentralised cooperation to the 
development of the ACP States, the Contracting Parties agree to intensify their efforts to 
encourage the participation of ACP and Community agents in cooperation activities". 
The main aim of decentralised cooperation was to better meet the needs and priorities of the 
people by extending the range of development players using new types of partnerships 
between the local and national public authorities, the private sector and civil society 
organisations. The idea was to encourage the redefinition of the role and responsibilities of 
each and every player in the development process by supporting a process to increase the 
responsibility of the decentralised players entailing the transfer of responsibility and the 
decentralisation of resources. 
This new approach to development cooperation will be taken even further by the European 
Commission with the Cotonou Agreements signed in June 2000. The Agreement includes the 
original measures that aim to promote participative approaches in a bid to ensure the 
involvement of civil society and social and economic players. In accordance with the 
conditions stipulated in the Agreement, non-state actors are informed and involved in the 
consultation on cooperation strategies and policies, on the priorities for cooperation, in 
particular in the areas that concern or affect them directly, and on political dialogue. They also 
receive financial resources to support the local development processes. Last but not least, they 
are involved in implementing cooperation projects and programmes in the areas that concern 
them (Lapeyre, 2005). 
Within this framework, the non-state actors receive support to boost their capacities in critical 
areas with a view to improving their skills, in particular as regards organisational matters, 
representation and the implementation of consultation mechanisms to enable them to promote 
strategic alliances. To meet local communities' development needs and to encourage all 
players involved in decentralised cooperation, who could contribute to the independent 
development of ACP countries, development cooperation helps to fund microprojects at local 
level that have an economic and social impact on the lives of the people and also helps to fund 
decentralised cooperation, in particular when it draws on the efforts and resources of 
organisations in the ACP countries and their counterparts in the European Union. 
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The European Commission has started to work with civil society and companies in order to 
promote social partners, social dialogue and partnerships in the ACP countries. The 
Commission will support efforts to: 
-strengthen the technical capacity of the social partners and of civil society; 
- develop institutions, mechanisms and practices to facilitate and consolidate the process of 
bipartite and tripartite social dialogue; 
- improve the involvement of the social partners and other civil society stakeholders in 
global governance (WTO, IFIs) on the basis of the OECD’s consultative model; 
- conclude transnational collective agreements and global framework agreements2. 
 
The other main way that non-state actors are involved in development cooperation is through 
the PRSPs – poverty reduction strategy papers – that were introduced at the end of 1999 
following a joint initiative by the IMF and the World Bank (World Bank, 2000; IMF, 2003). 
These papers are a new measure that aims to help the poor countries and the donors to boost 
the impact of their joint efforts to fight poverty. They represent the new development 
paradigm in the post-Washington Consensus period. 
 
Access to the resources of the main donors is increasingly subject to the country that is 
requesting the aid drawing up such a document, in which it specifies the social and economic 
situation in the country, the long-term poverty reduction objectives and the resources planned 
to achieve these objectives. This document differs in the fact that it must result from a 
consultative process with a high level of involvement of various players, in particular non-
state players. Since 1999, the PRSP measure has become wide-spread in the poor countries 
and almost 50 countries are involved in this process. 
 
The PRSPs have a number of objectives. One of the most important is encouraging the 
involvement of non-state actors by implementing a range of participative techniques and 
creating scope for dialogue and discussion. Internal and external partnerships have been set up 
on new foundations resulting from a greater or lesser extent of redistribution of the roles and 
responsibilities between the various development players: between the government, local 
public authorities, the private sector and civil society and between the government and the 
international donors.  
 
However, the processes for drawing up the PRSPs seem problematic, as demonstrated by an 
increasing number of case studies (Booth, 2003; Molenaers and Renard, 2002; Piron and 
Booth (2004)). These studies illustrate the paradoxical nature of the appropriation processes 
on account of the dominant role of the Bretton Woods organisations in prioritising objectives 
and choosing the policies to be pursued. The government is officially responsible for the 
PRSP, but the World Bank and the IMF are the ones that decide whether to validate it by 
granting credit or relieving debt. This power of veto will determine the nature of the policies 
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proposed. Moreover, the participation process is more often than not an information and 
consultation process which has very little influence on the final PRSP (ILO: 2005). 
The wealth of recommendations made by civil society agents is usually ignored. Moreover, 
they are not involved in all aspects of the poverty reduction strategy since the main aim 
consisting of adapting to the standards of the globalised economy cannot be discussed in any 
of the cases. The PRSPs have hence not paved the way for alternative development strategies 
and instead remain extremely similar to the former structural adjustment programmes in terms 
of content, although the form has changed and includes participative procedures (Lapeyre and 
Yepez, 2005).  
5  – General social and economic context and implications for the formulation of 
development policies 
 
     The macroeconomic indicators are as different as the production structures in the ACP 
countries. These indicators give rise to problems as regards interpretation since in several 
cases the reference years and the macroeconomic aggregates used as a basis for the national 
reports are not the same. Moreover, important data are not available or the methods used to 
obtain them are not satisfactory. This is the case, for example, with employment statistics. It 
is hence extremely difficult to get an idea of the employment situation because no statistical 
method is available which can monitor the labour market  permanently and which is adapted 
to the realities of these economies that are characterised by the predominance of the informal 
sector in the structure of employment. 
 
A) Countries in west Africa 
 
a1) Macroeconomic indicators, production structures and specialisations 
 
     The examples of Benin, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Ghana show that the 
macroeconomic indicators vary greatly from one country to another. These indicators simply 
reflect the national and regional economic situation. However, the factors explaining the 
situation would require a sectoral analysis that does not just go into greater depth but also 
covers a longer period and takes account of the international and sub-regional economic 
situation. 
 
Table 1: Some indicators per country (WAEMU) 
 
Sources: National reports - 
Senegal, Togo, Benin and 
Burkina Faso, 2005. 
   
    Despite major variations in the 
growth rates between and within 
the countries in the region, table 
1 shows that the WAEMU has 
been experiencing positive 
growth rates since 2000, apart 
from in Guinea where GDP per 
capita fell by 32% between 1999 
and 2003 following the 
 Country Years Growth rate of 
GDP 
2003 6.5%  
Burkina Faso 2004 4% 
2000 2% 
2001 6% 
2005 3% 
2002 4.5% 
 
Benin  
2003 4.5% 
2000 3.7%  
Ghana 
 
2005 5.8% 
2000 5.6% 
2001 5.6% 
2002 1.1% 
 
Senegal 
2003 6.3% 
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devaluation of the Guinean franc and as a result of certain external factors that crippled 
economic development: insecurity in neighbouring countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) 
which led to an influx of refugees and uncertainty from potential investors in the region; the 
drop in the world price of bauxite and alumina, which together represent over 60% (in value) 
of the countries exports; and the general price increase in imported petroleum products 
(Republic of Guinea, 2004). 
 
Over the last few years, Ghana has been experiencing sustained growth. GDP growth 
increased from 3.7% in 2000 to 5.8% in 2005 (Government of Ghana, 2005). This growth can 
mainly be attributed to a net improvement in the world cocoa market. However, given the 
nature of the growth, it did not result in the creation of many jobs and remains highly 
dependent on changes in world market prices. In Senegal, real GDP per capita has seen a 
slight increase in recent years as a result of positive economic growth rates since 2000 (World 
Bank, 2005). The economy in Burkina Faso has developed over the last few years during a 
period of growth which is relatively high compared to other countries in the WAEMU. 
Burkina Faso's extremely high rate of growth in 2003 (6.5%), although partially attributable 
to cyclical factors (an excellent cotton season and record cereal production), demonstrated the 
resistance of Burkina Faso's economy to the worsening of the crisis in the Ivory Coast 
(AFDB/OECD, 2005). However, the weaker growth rate in 2004 (4%) acted as a reminder 
that Burkina Faso remains a country with little diversity and extremely limited comparative 
advantages where social and economic development (which is fairly slow, or disappointing) is 
very vulnerable to changes in conditions over which it has no control, such as climate, 
parasites, terms of trade or parity between the euro and the dollar. Between 2000 and 2004, 
real GDP per capita averaged $280 per habitant, which meant that Burkina Faso was classed 
as a low-income countries. The primary sector plays a driving role in growth in Burkina Faso. 
It is mainly dominated by cotton and cereal crops and accounted for approximately 31% of 
GDP in 2003 and employed between 80 and 90% of the active population. The secondary and 
tertiary sectors represented 22% and 47% of GDP respectively in 2003 (AFDB/OECD, 2005). 
 
Economic performance in Togo since 2000 falls short of expectations and is insufficient to 
bring about a noticeable difference in the living standards of the population. Although Togo's 
economy recorded growth rates of 4.5% in 2002 and 2003 and, after periods of decline of real 
GDP, GDP increased on average by about 2.5% between 2000 and 2004, growth still 
remained below population change (approximately 2.7%). This situation resulted in a decline 
of GDP per capita from FCFA 60,200 in 2000 to FCFA 59,700 in 2003 (Ministry of the 
Economy, Finance and Privatisation, 2004: 6). Against this backdrop, purchasing power of 
the population and workers continued to fall and the impact of multidimensional and 
monetary poverty affects the majority of Togo's population. 
 
In terms of production structures, of the contribution made by different sectors to creating 
value added and of the percentage of the active population per sector, the economies in the 
WAEMU zone are fairly poorly diversified, are outward-looking and are heavily dependent 
on primary (agricultural) products, the prices of which are subject to major fluctuations on the 
international markets. This is the case in Benin where cotton accounts for 80% of income 
from exports and almost 15% of national income. Burkina Faso has the same production 
profile with cotton and cereals accounting for approximately 31% of the GDP in 2003 and 
between 80 and 90% of the active population. Agriculture and breeding is also dominant in 
the primary sector and accounts for 18% of the national GDP. Senegal's economy is 
characterised by a large services sector. This sector represents 31% of production and 
provides almost half the value added (44.5%). However, the agricultural sector employs over 
 1
half the active population and 68% of the female workforce, although proportionally 
speaking, it only makes a small contribution to production and value added, 21% and 23% 
respectively. The industrial sector accounts for a large proportion of production (40.5%) and 
creates 24% of the value added.  
 
Table 2: Relative economic weighting of different production sectors (WAEMU). 
 
Country (reference 
year) 
Sectors Percentage of the 
active population per 
sector 
Weighting of the 
primary sector in the 
national economy 
Primary (agriculture, 
breeding, fishing, 
mines, etc.) 
 
             55% 
 
       34-36 % of GDP 
Secondary (industry, 
energy, etc.) 
             n.d  
 
Benin 
Tertiary (trade, 
administration, 
services) 
              
             n.d 
    
     30-35 % of GDP 
Primary (agriculture, 
breeding, fishing, 
mines, etc.) 
 
             67% (2004) 
 
 45% (2003) and 48% 
(2004) of GDP 
Secondary (industry, 
energy, etc.) 
             n.d   23% (2003) and 25% 
(2004) of GDP 
 
Togo(2003 and 2004) 
Tertiary (trade, 
administration, 
services) 
              n.d             
       32% of GDP 
(2003) 
Primary (agriculture, 
breeding, fishing, 
mines, etc.) 
          
           80 to 90% 
 
          31% of GDP 
Secondary (industry, 
energy, etc.) 
              n.d            22% of GDP  
 
Burkina Faso (2003) 
Tertiary (trade, 
administration, 
services) 
              n.d             
            47% of GDP  
Primary (agriculture, 
breeding, fishing, 
mines, etc.) 
              n.d  18% of GDP (less 
than 1% for fishing) 
Secondary (industry, 
energy, etc.) 
              n.d             17% of GDP 
 
Guinea 
Tertiary (trade, 
administration, 
services) 
              n.d              
             50% of GDP 
Primary (agriculture, 
breeding, fishing, 
mines, etc.) 
 
       Over 50% 
  
              21% of GDP 
Secondary (industry, 
energy, etc.) 
              n.d               24% of GDP 
 
 
Senegal 
Tertiary (trade, 
administration, 
services) 
              n.d               44.5% of 
GDP 
 1
Sources: national reports - Guinea, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Togo and Benin, 2005. 
 
Another characteristic of the developing countries, which is clearly apparent in all the 
countries examined here, is the high degree of informality of the economy. This is a result of 
the structural adjustment programmes which have caused a withdrawal from the public and 
private formal sector. In Senegal, the modern sector co-exists with a fairly well developed 
informal sector composed of small family companies and small-time traders. In 2003, the 
informal sector accounted for 54% of GDP and 47% of intermediary consumption, and 
thereby plays an important role in economic activities and in improving the well-being of the 
population. Since it has a strong presence in the production apparatus, it develops intense and 
diverse activities. Informal activities account for 95.5% of production in the primary sector. In 
the secondary and tertiary sectors, this percentage is 27% and 55% respectively. The 
development of the informal sector goes hand in hand with a reduction in the proportion 
represented by tradable goods and services in the GDP. Tradable GDP, which totalled 35.2% 
for 1985-1993 period, fell to 32.8% for the 1994-2003 period (OECD, 2005). In Senegal, only 
21.8% (15.5% men and 6.3% women) of the workers work in the formal sector. In Ghana, the 
formal sector accounts for no more than 20% in the structure of employment and is only 
capable of creating 5,000 new jobs per year, whereas almost 250,000 new people join the 
labour market each year. 
 
Informalising the labour market has disastrous consequences for the living and working 
conditions of workers and their families. The formal sector does not provide adequate social 
protection to workers and these workers are not signed up to the national pension scheme, nor 
do they benefit from the minimum health and safety standards. 
 
 
a2) Links between economic growth, poverty and access to basic services 
 
     The general conclusion of the analysis of all the national reports is the poor social impact 
of the fruits of this growth. In the majority of cases, the wealth created is not shared fairly, no 
additional jobs are created and there is no noticeable reduction in the level of poverty. The  
people in Benin were so aware of this that they created the popular slogan: “la croissance ; ça 
ne se mange pas!” (you can't eat growth). Hence the reason why there is such a huge 
discrepancy between meeting the needs of the people and the positive image presented by the 
macroeconomic indicators. In fact, although growth in Benin totalled 4% in 2002, the country 
is paradoxically witnessing an increase in the number of people unable to satisfy their daily 
food needs. The country's national report therefore highlights the increase in poverty indexes 
and an increase in inequalities. The evaluation of the national poverty reduction strategy 
performed by the IMF in July 2005 indicates that the level of monetary poverty remained 
unchanged between 1999 and 2002 (29% in 1999 and 28.5% in 2002) and that the human 
poverty index (HPI-1) improved slightly, falling from 51.4 in 1999 to 49.9 in 2000 and to 
48.9 in 2002. The HDI, as measured by the UNDP also increased very slightly from 0.422 in 
2000 to 0.431 in 2003. The UNDP estimates that 33% of the total population was living 
below the poverty line in 2003 and that, if this pace continues, Benin will not be able to reach 
its Millennium Development Goals. 
 
    Despite a slight increase in income per capita, Burkina Faso is witnessing a similar 
situation. Its high level of economic growth over the last five years (see table 1), has not 
managed to bring about a major increase in the well-being of its population. Approximately 
45% of the population lives on less than $1 a day and 81% on less than $2 a day. In Guinea, 
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poor people make up 49% of the population (27.2% very poor). Poverty is even more blatant 
in the rural areas (56% poor people, 35% very poor), than in the urban areas (33% poor 
people, 31.5% very poor). The socio-professional category of the head of the family 
(apprentice, family helper, self-employed, not in active employment, unemployed and so on) 
has a major impact on poverty in both rural and urban areas. Although there is more poverty 
in the rural areas than in the urban areas in Guinea, a positive correlation exists between 
urbanisation and unemployment. In fact, according to the ILO unemployment in Guinea is a 
purely urban phenomenon. 
 
The growth recorded over the last few years in Ghana has only benefited a small proportion of 
the population and inequalities have continued to increase. The benefits of the growth are 
concentrated amongst large owners of export cultures, to the detriment of the small-time 
farmers. Ghana's Gini coefficient is currently 0.6, which makes it one of the countries with the 
most unfair distribution of income in the world. In Senegal, the return of growth recorded 
between 1995 and 2001 neither led to a reduction in poverty nor to the creation of additional 
jobs. The country is witnessing a slight improvement in income per capita, which increased 
from $526 in 1993 to $655 in 2003. There is a very unfair distribution of income in the 
country, where 60% of the households share 23% of the national income, whilst 20% of the 
households receive approximately 60% of the national income. In Togo, at the end of the 
1990s it was estimated that approximately 33% of the active population was unemployed 
(Bendokat and Tovo, 1999: 4). A more recent study puts this figure at 40% in Lomé in 2001 
and estimates the number of unemployed graduates at between 21,000 and 25,000 (Bokor, 
2001: 35). 
 
     The positive correlation that is generally assumed to exist between high growth and a 
reduction in poverty is not at all confirmed in practice in this area. This is also true for 
unemployment, whose generally counter-cyclical character in relation to growth is not 
confirmed either. These results are hardly surprising if we take a close look at table 2. In fact, 
it is not just that the structural adjustments are still being made and that they are imposing 
restrictive monetary and budgetary policies, but also the fact that it is not the primary sector – 
the largest provider of jobs in these countries – that is the driver of the growth. Instead, it is 
mainly the tertiary sector, which employs a small proportion of the population, that plays this 
role. With so many poor people and such a high level of unemployment, it is to be expected 
that access to basic services leaves much to be desired and is not improving much. See tables 
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, that provide information on the situation in the WAEMU zone. 
 
B) Countries in central and south-east Africa 
 
 
b1) Macroeconomic indicators, production structures and specialisations 
 
     The observations regarding the interpretation of the data made in the case of west Africa 
also apply to central and south-east Africa. The trends uncovered by the economic aggregates 
are the results of a range of inter-linked factors related to the structures of the national 
economies, the international economic situation, the domestic social and political situation, 
structural adjustment programmes and other older domestic political and economic 
characteristics. 
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     Some ACP countries in this region have endured violent conflicts in recent years, which 
have seriously affected their development potential. A clear example of this is the Central 
African Republic, a landlocked country which has suffered from civil, political and military 
problems since 1976. The sorry state of its production structures, the loss of confidence of 
business people, the lack of a calm environment and industrial peace which are conducive to 
economic activities, and a shortage of activities capable of generating income are some of the 
main reasons for the dramatic drop in the growth rate from 0.9% in 2000 to –7.7% in 2003. 
The country's national report highlights the fact that it lost over 50% of its industrial 
equipment and infrastructure for production and processing. 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is another example of a highly unfavourable 
national context. The country suffered from a decade of war and cyclical violence resulting in 
almost 3.5 million deaths and inherent economic and environmental damage. However, 
despite all the problems that persist in the east of the country, the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo seems to be improving. The end of large-scale hostilities in late 2002, the 
creation of a national union government in June 2003 and the national strategy and the NIP 
approved in September 2003 contributed to the economic upturn, the political recovery and 
the improvement in security. The new Constitution was recently approved with mass support 
and the first multi-party elections since independence are planned for next June. A 
humanitarian action plan for $682 million has recently been approved. GDP is increasing 
(+5.7% in 2003, +6.8% in 2004) following several years of dramatic decline and forecasts for 
2005 and 2006 are verging on 7%. Inflation has been brought down from 135% in 2000 to 
23% in 2005. The DRC has also benefited from the increase in prices of primary products and 
has made great efforts to attract investors. The primary sector accounts for 56% of GDP, the 
secondary sector for 11% (construction) and the tertiary sector for 30% (development of 
transport and telecommunications). The informal sector has developed considerably despite 
the paralysis of the banking system and the weakness of micro-financing. 
 
The situation in Burundi is similar. Following the embargo imposed on the country between 
1996 and 1999, cooperation was relaunched after the signing of the Arusha agreements and 
the creation of a transition government. The EU helped in the rehabilitation of Burundi by 
supporting democratic transition, peace building and production activities and infrastructures. 
The 9th EDF (2003-2007) earmarked €172 million for developing production activities in the 
rural sector, fostering good governance and supporting macroeconomic policies. Growth is 
increasing (+ 4.8% in 2004 and 5% forecast for 2005) but depends greatly on climatic 
conditions (excellent coffee plantation year in 2004-2005 and increase in world prices) and on 
domestic security. The primary sector accounts for 40% of GDP (coffee and tea exports). The 
United Nation Observation Mission (UNOB), in which 600 players have been involved since 
2004, stimulated demand for local products, in particular food products. The privatisation of 
the coffee sector and the liberalisation of the sugar sector and the currency system did not 
attract many investors since the country was still considered too risky. The NIP strategy and 
the measures advocated by the international institutions to liberalise the economy and 
prioritise private investment were only partially implemented. However, a mass influx of 
external aid and debt relief made it possible for Burundi to stabilise its balance of payments. 
 
In Rwanda, the positive growth rates of GDP since 2000 can be partially attributed to the 
increase – linked to the present economic climate - in exports of coffee and ores. In 2001, 
2002 and 2004, the cash crop production sector (coffee exports) benefited greatly from the 
increase in the price of coffee (National Bank of Rwanda (BNR), Annual report 2004, pp. 26 
and 171) and the ore export sector recorded a huge increase in both the price of cassiterite on 
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the international market and its production in the first few years of this decade (BNR, Annual 
report 2004, pp. 26 and 171). 
 
Gabon has certain similarities to a cash economy, which is based on a few exported primary 
products without much diversification. However, Gabon has witnessed a decline in its 
production of oil since the end of the 1990s because production is levelling off, causing 
economic growth to fall (-10% GDP in 1999, -0.3% in 2002). This was slightly offset recently 
by the increase in the price of crude oil (+1.4% GDP in 2004, +2.2% in 2005). Oil actually 
accounts for 30% of its GDP and 70% of its income from export. In a bid to diversify its 
economy, Gabon has invested in the production of manganese, uranium, wood, coffee and 
rubber, but these too are primary products that are affected by changes in market prices. 
 
As for the other countries in this region, note should be taken of the case of Mauritius which 
is considered to be a genuine economic success story. Its annual growth is about 4-5% (8% in 
2000, 5% in 2001, 1.9% in 2002 because of cyclone Dina, but 4.3% in 2003 and 4% in 2004 
and 2005). Sugar was the main driver of growth between 1970 and 1980, followed by textiles 
between 1980 and 2000. The successive turnarounds of these sectors have created a more 
diversified economy which includes services, tourism, financial products and ICT. This 
performance is also based on a high level of domestic savings (24.9% of GDP in 2003), which 
is higher than investments (23.6%). Mauritius is still experiencing strong growth of GDP, 
estimated at 6.4% for 2005. GDP per capita increased at an average rate of 4.7% per year 
between 1995 and 2005. The two most important sectors in terms of employment are the 
manufacturing industry and tourism which together employ 45% of the active population. The 
unemployment rate is estimated at 9.6% for 2005. 
 
Since 1997, Madagascar has seen its GDP increase by approximately 5% per year, although 
the political crisis, external disasters (three cyclones in 2000) and the increase in the price of 
food products and oil have slowed down its growth. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 
decade, the way had been paved for sustainable development thanks to the rapid resolution of 
the political crisis in 2002 and the sound recovery following the external disasters. Economic 
growth (+4.5% between 1997 and 2001) can be attributed to exports that doubled in value 
over this period, mainly as a result of the positive development of international prices of 
certain primary products, such as vanilla. 
 
The Seychelles are a small island state that is distanced from the large markets and has limited 
resources. Before independence, it was a subsistence economy with a GDP of less than $1,000 
per capita. Since, agriculture and, above all, fishing have developed. The Seychelles export 
fish for $185 million to the European Union, with which it has signed an important 
agreement. But it is above all the development of tourism, which accounts for 70% of external 
trade and employs one third of the active population, that has made strong economic growth 
possible. Nonetheless, the country remains extremely vulnerable to external economic crises 
and is experiencing financial difficulties that are hindering its ambitious development project. 
Tourism, fishing and agriculture employ 57% of the workforce, but small individual business 
leaders, temporary workers, domestic workers and small-time farmers have to be added to this 
figure. The economic structure in the Comoros is dominated by agriculture which accounts 
for 80% of employment at 40% of GDP. The agriculture here is mainly subsistence 
agriculture and is not enough to guarantee the food self-sufficiency of the country, which 
therefore has to import food products. 
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The majority of these countries therefore have an extremely limited production base like those  
in west Africa. Mining and agricultural cash crops are predominant here in terms of export 
income and impact on the growth rate. The result is a high level of dependency on external 
demand. The instability of external demand coupled with the instability of international prices 
weakens the national growth schemes. External factors such as the world prices of primary 
products, climate, parity between the euro and the dollar, substitutes to exported products, 
international demand and the local political situation make these economies very vulnerable 
and unstable. The revival of growth in the Central African Republic in 2004, following the 
rapid drop of 7.7% in 2003, did not result from the dynamic nature of the local economy but 
rather purely from the increase in the world prices of diamonds and lumber. This is also the 
case for Burundi's economy which is heavily dependent on the success of its exports of 
Arabica coffee and tea. As for Gabon, its economy has also been going through a critical 
period since 1998 because of the sharp decline in oil production and exportation of 11.9%. 
Hence the cyclical economic crises which are often caused by the same factors. 
 
Gabon, which is one of the largest oil producers in the area, is the most typical case of a cash 
economy. Between 1990 and 2002 Gabon's economy was strongly based on mining and 
exporting crude oil (30% of GDP and almost 70% of total state income). Therefore, an 11.9% 
reduction in the mining and exporting of oil led to a 9.6% reduction in Gabon's GDP in 1999.  
 
b2) Links between economic growth, poverty and access to basic services 
 
     In this region too, there is no correlation, with the exception of Mauritius, between the 
growth performance and the improvement of living conditions. In Gabon, GDP per capita is 
still high ($5,500). With an ever increasing rate of unemployment (20% in 2000) and over 
41% of the population living under the poverty line, Gabon's economy and society are 
characterised by severe inequalities in the distribution of national income. Since over 80% of 
Gabon's population lives on less than the minimum wage and 60% do not even have two-
thirds of the minimum means of subsistence (WB, 2005), it follows that there is less and less 
access to basic goods and services that are increasingly frequently provided by the private 
sector. Moreover, the HDI has fallen, with Gabon going from 109th place out of 162 in 2001 
to 123rd place out of 177 in 2005. The inequalities in the distribution of income are therefore 
the main characteristic of the social and economic base, as demonstrated by the difference 
between GDP per capita and the HDI. The good ratings regarding the percentage of children 
in full-time education and the level of literacy (74% and 71% respectively for an investment 
of 3.9% of GDP) conceal the fact that the percentage of people completing their studies is 
much lower and the fact that they are unsuitable for the labour market. This is why the EU is 
supporting the education system that is due to be entirely overhauled. Public health 
expenditure only accounts for 1.8% of GDP. The lack of resources plus the absence of any 
strategic planning make access to social services vastly insufficient, especially in the rural 
areas and in the shanty towns, that are  particularly neglected. 
 
In the DRC, GDP per capita increased from $85 in 2000 to $119 in 2004, but at this rate it 
will take 70 years to get back up to the level of the 1960s ($380)! Moreover, the number of 
people in employment has fallen dramatically, apart from integration into militias in the 
national army, and at present barely 10% of the active population is engaged in formal 
employment. The ANAPI (National Agency for Investment Promotion) launched 308 projects 
in a bid to create 45,000 jobs. In 2003, 41% of the population lived under the poverty line, 
mainly because salaries remained unpaid, including those for people working in the army and 
the police. The government began breaking up the commercial and industrial state monopolies 
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and reforming the public companies (privatisation or co-management) and privatised the 
mining conglomerates. 36,000 surplus public jobs will have to be cut within the framework of 
a plan to improve public finances funded by the World Bank. However, water and electricity 
will remain in state hands. 
 
In Rwanda, the fruits of the growth were concentrated in the hands of a small minority of 
people who had mainly invested in real estate which experienced a huge boom, in particular 
in the capital of Kigali where population has tripled in 10 years. The living conditions of the 
population in general and workers in particular have therefore barely improved. According to 
a report entitled Independent Evaluation of Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002 – 
2005 ( PRSP1)3 published on 20 February 2006 by Alison Evans (IDS), Laure-Hélène Piron 
(ODI), Zaza Curran (ODI) and Ruth Driscoll (ODI) together with Charles Twesigye-
Bwakwatsa (Centre for Resource Analysis) and Iyadema Sezikeye J. Bosco (Centre for 
Resource Analysis), the number of poor people has not decreased, on the contrary it has 
increased since the rates of economic growth have not been able to clearly top the normal rate 
of population growth of 3.2% per year. Moreover, workers' purchasing power is continuing to 
fall since prices (fuel, energy, transport, living, medication and so on) are continuing to rise 
but incomes are barely changing. Social security and social protection for workers is reserved 
for a tiny minority, which does not even equate to 15% of the entire workforce. The risks 
covered are old age and invalidity in the event of an accident at work. Health insurance 
provided by the health insurance funds in the administrative districts only covers about 12% 
of the total population (IERPS 2002-2005, pp. 11, 53-55). 
 
In Madagascar, poverty has not decreased despite the growth and, according to estimations 
from 2004, almost 75% of the population still lives below the poverty line. Workers' 
purchasing power remains low and is further reduced as a result of the increase in the prices 
of basic products of approximately 13% per year, the doubling of electricity prices and a 10% 
increase on fuel.  
 
The only country where there has been a general improvement in living conditions is 
Mauritius, and this is due to economic growth. Life expectancy has increased, there has been 
a reduction in infant mortality and basic infrastructures have been strengthened. However, the 
increase in the cost of living and the increase in unemployment are giving rise to a number of 
discussions regarding 'an economic development of job losses'. In fact, growth has not created 
enough jobs and the unemployment rate has increased from less than 3% in 1990 to 10.6% in 
June 2004, before falling to 9.2% at the end of 2005. Changes to the economy and the 
structure of the labour market make it impossible for low-skilled workers in industry to 
transfer over to tourism, the financial sector or ICT. The decline of traditional sectors to the 
benefit of modern sectors gives rise to the need for capital and highly-skilled workers. We are 
hence witnessing an increase in the informal sector in Mauritius, since many Mauritians 
prefer to work in this way by setting up their own small activity. This is why, despite a 
general increase in living standards over the last five years and plans to combat the precarious 
nature of employment, some persistent pockets of poverty remain due to an unfair distribution 
of resources. The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer and these inequalities 
are extremely visible because the island is so small. 
 
                                                 
3
  Abbreviation: IERPS 2002- 2005 
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C) The Caribbean countries 
 
C1) Macroeconomic indicators, production structures and specialisations 
 
The Caribbean countries have been experiencing moderate economic growth since the 
beginning of the decade (with the exception of Grenada and Haiti). The Dominican Republic 
is experiencing strong economic growth (+8% in 2005), which bears witness to the 
consolidation of the relaunch process within the framework of the IMF's Standby 
Agreements. Consumption increased by 17% as a result of the stabilisation of the exchange 
rate, the slowing down of inflation and a reduction in interest rates. The dynamic nature of 
tourism and the free zones, coupled with significant foreign direct investment (FDI), boosted 
growth and enabled the country to pay off its debts within the specified deadlines. 
 
Barbados is witnessing an economic upturn following the recession of 1991/1992. The period 
between 1993 and 2000 was the longest phase of expansion ever recorded by the country 
since independence. The average growth rate of GDP is 2.8% per year. Economic activity 
declined in 2001 when the country registered a 2.6% reduction in the growth rate of GDP. 
The recession affected the sugar and non-sugar agricultural sector, tourism (drop of 5.9%), 
international trade and financial services. The economy got back on track in 2002 and still 
relies heavily on tourism (7.7% increase), construction (2.9% increase), transport and 
communications. This trend was confirmed in 2004 and 2005 when growth rates were 
estimated at 4.8% and 4.1%. GDP growth forecast for 2006 totals 4%. Jamaica has also been 
experiencing positive growth rates in recent years. It production structure is dominated by the 
services sector which accounts for almost 65% of GDP. Moreover, Jamaica has free access to 
the European Union's markets for rum, sugar and bananas, which account for almost 36.2% of 
exports. 
 
Given the importance of the tourism industry in the structure of the economy, Grenada's 
economy was hard hit by the repercussions of 11 September and by hurricanes Ivan (2004) 
and Emily (2005). Recent poor economic performance can be attributed to these external 
factors. After the recession of 2001, real GDP increased by 5.7% in 2003 when tourist activity 
picked up again. But then Grenada was hit by hurricane Ivan in 2004 which caused damage 
equal to 200% of GDP and destroyed or damaged almost 90% of the buildings in the country. 
This resulted in a 3% reduction in economic activity and the restaurant/hotel sector saw a 25% 
reduction in activity.  
 
Haiti, which has been suffering from political instability in recent years, has an economy in 
the throes of a crisis which is only surviving today thanks to the loans provided by the 
international banks, multiple aid and money from the Diaspora mainly from the US and 
Canada. After a slight economic upturn in 1995, the fragile national economy was quickly 
plunged back into crisis as a result of political turbulence, making it even weaker. The growth 
rate in the country was 3.1% in 1997-1998 and -1.2% in 2000-2001. Haiti's economy seems to 
be completely lacking any sort of structure. The primary sector (30% of GDP and 60% of the 
active population) is composed mainly of subsistence agriculture across all the small farms. 
The secondary sector (assembly of imported products) accounts for 21% of GDP and 20% of 
the working population. Tourism, which was previously an important source of income, was 
hard hit by the political problems. Foreign aid and transfers made by a large Diaspora are the 
country's only lifelines. 2005 saw a reduction in GDP (-3.8%), in consumption (-2%) and in 
investment (-3.1%), a slight increase in export (2.8%) and imports remain more or less stable 
(0.2%). 
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Growth rate of GDP (%) 
 
Country  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Barbados  2.3 -2.6 0.5 2.0 4.4 3.2 
Grenada  7.0 -4.4 0.8 5.7 -3.0  
Jamaica  1.0 1.3 1.9 2.1  2.2 
Surinam  -0.1 4.5 3.0 5.6 4.2  
Source: government authorities, IMF fund staff estimates  
 
 
c2) Links between economic growth, poverty and access to basic services 
 
The Jamaican government has taken action to combat poverty with a national poverty 
eradication programme by boosting growth, fostering investments and promoting social and 
human development. Since the programme was launched, poverty has fallen from 27.5% in 
1995 to 19.7% in 2002, which equates to a reduction of 7.8%. 
 
The most recent study on poverty in Barbados dates back to 1996. However, Barbados is 
classed by the UNDP in the group of countries with high human development and was ranked 
30th out of 177 countries in 2005. Nonetheless, there is no changing the fact that despite good 
economic results, pockets of poverty still exist. That is why the government has become 
involved in a poverty reduction programme and has set up an office to pursue this objective 
within the Ministry of Social Affairs. Under the programme, unemployed people will be able 
to receive unemployment benefit, which is a real first in the Caribbean. 
 
In Haiti, unemployment and under employment affect 60% of the active population. Young 
people are turning towards the informal sector or to crime (drug trafficking, abduction). 
According to the most recent information available, over two-thirds of the workforce does not 
have a formal job (CIA, World outlook), 97% of the population has no social protection and 
60% is illiterate. One of the biggest challenges for human development in Haiti is mass 
poverty which affects the whole country. The highest levels of poverty are found in the north 
where 91% of households can be classed as poor and 81% as extremely poor. The mass rural 
exodus, which affects the large and secondary cities, gives rise to serious problems regarding 
basic services and the availability of housing. 
 
In the Dominican Republic, the unemployment rate was estimated at 17% in 2005 and the 
poverty rate at 25% (CIA, World outlook). Almost 50% of the people working in the non-
agricultural sector work in the informal sector. The reasons behind the growth of the informal 
sector in the Dominican Republic are primarily the global economic crises resulting from 
political decisions, in particular the debt crisis in the developing countries and the structural 
adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank (breaking up the public sector, 
deregulation of the labour market). The majority of workers excluded from the formal sector 
as the result of the crisis are women. A report by the Autonomous Confederation of Christian 
Trade Unions (CASC) indicates that women are the main victims of precarious working 
conditions and the impoverishment created by the crisis. 
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D) Pacific countries 
 
d1) Macro-economic indicators, production structures and specialisations 
 
Thanks to its forestry resources, ores and fishing, Fiji is one of the most developed economies 
in the Pacific islands. Following negative growth in GDP in 2000 (-2.8%) caused by the coup 
d'état, 2001 to 2004 saw substantial increases (2.7%, 4.35%, 3% and 4.1%). The slowdown in 
2005 and 2006 (1.7% and 0.7% forecasted) is due to the end of US textile quotas and the 
uncertainties weighing down on the sector, as well as to a reduction in public investment. 
GDP per capita has risen steadily from $4,327 in 2000 to around $6,000 in 2005. 
 
 Sugar exports and the development of the tourism industry are the two main sources of 
income. The Fijian authorities are supporting foreign investment in a bid to achieve 
sustainable economic growth and a high level of employment. Many incentives for investors 
have been introduced, including the creation of free zones, the abolition of taxes, the covering 
of losses and the repatriation of profits. A case-by-case approach is often taken, offering 
various types of aid and incentive. 
 
Vanuatu is a country comprising 80 islands, of which 65 are inhabited, with a population of 
205,000. Its economy is based on the primary sector, with 65% of the population living off 
small farms. The country is also very prone to natural disasters, including cyclones, typhoons, 
volcanic eruptions (most recently on 27 November 2005), earthquakes and tsunamis. These 
have a major impact on the economy, which is characterised by ups and downs (+2.7% of 
GDP in 2000, -2.7% in 2001, -4.9% in 2002, +2.9% in 2003, +2.2% (estimated) in 2004); the 
average over the past few years can at best be described as stagnation. Even when growth 
recovers, it cannot make up for the country's demographic expansion. Vanuatu survives 
mainly on foreign aid, from Australia and New Zealand in particular, a little tourism and some 
beef, kava, copra, coconut and cocoa exports. However, the low level of investment, the 
country's mountainous terrain and small size, the fact that its islands are widely dispersed and 
located far from markets, its limited resources, vulnerability to natural disasters and 
production costs are holding back any real development. 
 
Similar problems are faced by Kiribati, with its 33 atolls clustered into three groups of islands 
(Gilbert, Line and Phoenix) and a population of 103,000. However, the country remains very 
dependent on Australia and New Zealand, which are responsible for its security, as Kiribati 
has no army and fewer than 500 police officers. Following a few years of growth between 
1995 and 1999 (3.5% in 1995, 7.3% in 1998, 2.3% in 1999), a downturn ensued (-4% in 2000, 
+2% in 2001 and an estimated +1.5% subsequently). The country's main sources of income 
are money sent back from its workers abroad (over $5 million a year), tourism (3,000 to 4,000 
visitors a year, bringing in $5-10 million – equivalent to 20% of GDP), foreign aid (an 
estimated $20-25 million from the UK, Japan, Australia and New Zealand), fishing rights in 
territorial waters paid for by the major Asian powers and the US ($20-35 million a year) and 
copra and fish exports (the majority of the active male population works in the fishing 
industry). Nonetheless, as with Vanuatu, the small size and scattered nature of the islands, 
natural disasters, the lack of jobs and the low skill levels of the population, limited natural 
resources, the restricted local market, global competitiveness and social and cultural 
constraints are hindering development. 
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d2) Links between economic growth, poverty and access to basic services  
 
In Fiji, following the serious political crisis in May 2000, large-scale redundancies took place 
and many working hours were lost. The areas most affected were tourism, the textile industry, 
retail sales and construction. Companies began re-hiring in the second half of 2003 but are 
unable to absorb the 17,000 people entering the labour market each year. There has been a 
drop in formal sector employment and a corresponding rise in informal sector employment. In 
the tourism industry, 75% of workers are employed under temporary contracts. Land 
ownership rights have led to a major drop in agricultural jobs as leases are not being renewed. 
The secondary sector employs staff under temporary contracts which expire when the job is 
complete. Meanwhile, industry is stagnating as clothing factories close due to the expiry of 
textile quotas with the US, leading to many job losses. In the public sector, privatisations and 
restructurings have resulted in major cutbacks and many job losses. Only the service sector 
remains dynamic, thanks to the increase in tourism and the number of hotels; the rest of the 
private sector is being held back by the low level of investment. 
  
Accordingly, Fiji fell from 44th place in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1995 to 
81st in 2003, due mainly to the rise in unemployment. Data for 2000-2005 are scarce but 
resources are certainly very unequally distributed and the gap between the highest and lowest 
incomes has widened considerably. The official poverty rate is 25% but a more realistic 
estimate is 40%. Despite the large amounts earmarked for poverty reduction projects 
($54.76 million in 2003 and $55.5 million in 2004), no progress has been seen among 
disadvantaged populations and workers.  
 
The public sector reforms aimed at reducing the number of civil servants and cutting costs and 
improving performance, the use of public funds, productivity and efficiency have had largely 
negative effects, creating insecurity at work, stress, anxiety and forcing civil servants to 
choose between keeping their jobs and accepting a generous redundancy payment. The trade 
union movement is aware of the impact these reforms have had on workers and on the 
organisation itself; the unions have been affected by this disaster and are witnessing the 
gradual erosion of workers' rights. 
 
Vanuatu is considered one of the poorest island nations in the Pacific and remains extremely 
dependent on foreign aid. Its GDP per capita rose from 100,000 vatus in 1997 to 175,000 in 
2000, only to fall again to 163,000 in 2003. A minimum monthly income of 20,000 vatus 
($179) was introduced in 2000 but this is not enough to offset the increase in living costs. The 
unemployment rate is not available; all that is known is that 16,200 people were employed in 
the formal sector in 2004 (excluding subsistence farming) and the informal sector expanded 
between 2000 and 2001 only to shrink subsequently. Agriculture remains the most dynamic 
sector, with the number of jobs increasing from 14,300 in 1997 to 18,600 in 2001, thanks to 
exports of kava, biscuits, bananas, copra and coconuts. No information is available on income 
distribution but since 2002 employment in the sector has apparently been suffering due to 
natural disasters. The canning, biscuit and ice-cream industries are suffering from cheaper 
imports resulting from the reduction or scrapping of customs duties from the Melanesian 
countries. This has led to a drop in the number of workers employed in the secondary sector. 
The public sector has been considerably reduced over recent years. Employment in the service 
sector has increased but remains subject to fluctuations in tourism caused by the natural 
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disasters that prevent stable long-term development. The poverty index is 46.4%, which 
means that almost half of the population lives on less than $1 a day. Despite wage increases, 
the majority of the population has been unable to attain a decent standard of living. Vanuatu is 
ranked 118th in the Human Development Index (HDI). There has been a focus on poverty 
reduction programmes supported by institutions such as the Asian Development Bank. A final 
point to bear in mind is that the only public social security system is in serious financial 
trouble due to enormous budget deficits and serious management errors. 
 
In Kiribati, GDP per capita stood at $600 in 2000. Purchasing power has not increased and the 
majority of workers have very low incomes, barely over the poverty line, which makes a 
decent standard of living impossible for very large families. In 2004, the Asian Development 
Bank estimated that around half of the country's population had an unacceptable standard of 
living. Formal sector employment has been in constant decline due to restructurings and the 
current privatisation process. Industry is subject to major fluctuations. Fishing and crafts are 
the two main industrial activities but they are vulnerable to changes in demand and to natural 
disasters. The secondary sector accounted for 7% of GDP in 1998 and 11% in 1999, but fell 
back to 7.3% in 2000. Most jobs are located in the service sector, where employment has 
expanded due to tourism. The tertiary sector accounted for 73.7% of GDP in 1995 and 83% in 
2000. The public sector saw substantial job losses, despite the large-scale strike action in 
2000, followed by a slight rise in 2003. It still accounts for 80% of the working population's 
income. Investment in agriculture and diversification of production, together with a lack of 
jobs in other sectors, have led to an increase in the number of people working in this sector. 
Agriculture, which generated 20% of GDP a few years ago, had fallen to 17.6% by 1999. The 
informal sector fluctuates due to cyclones, which damage infrastructure and small retail sales 
business, and competition from cheap imports (local production costs remain high). 
Nonetheless, small factories account for 5-11% of new jobs. 
 
6 – Involvement of the trade union movement and workers' associations in defining and 
implementing the national development strategy  
 
The involvement of non-state actors is one of the aims of the new EU/ACP cooperation 
development agreements, but the answers provided by trade unions regarding the willingness 
of authorities to accept real trade union involvement in formulating development strategies 
suggest that this aim is far from being met. Involvement is often limited to the provision of 
information, whilst dialogue is at best limited to the Ministry of Employment and Social 
Affairs and does not involve the ministries that have a key role in drawing up the 
development strategy, namely the Economy and Budget Ministry or the Prime 
Minister's/President's office. 
 
Generally, civil society and workers' organisations are aware of the existence of the Cotonou 
Agreement and know that it contains provisions encouraging the involvement of non-state 
actors (NSAs) in ACP/EU cooperation. However, the trade unions are totally unaware of the 
mechanisms governing the innovations contained in the Agreement which facilitate their 
involvement and access to resources. Furthermore, in the participatory structures set up by the 
government, the trade unions feel that they are grouped together with the NGOs and their 
special status has not been acknowledged. Also, they are not stakeholders in the decision-
making processes but are in most cases merely consulted. As a result, they believe that their 
concerns are not being taken into account. Their knowledge of EPAs is very sketchy. More 
specifically, the trade union officers consulted said that they were not involved in the EPA 
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implementation processes currently under way. However, now that they realise the 
importance of these agreements for the national and regional economy, they are planning to 
develop alliances with the other actors in civil society to strengthen the EPAs and ensure that 
they become key players in formulating development strategy priorities.  
 
 Analysis of the involvement of trade unions and workers' associations in defining and 
implementing the national development strategy highlights three distinct situations: 
 
 
A) 1st group of ACP countries: no real trade union involvement  
 
      The first situation is the situation that prevails in all ACPs where there is no trade union 
involvement and where, consequently, union demands are not heard or taken into account. 
This is the case, for example, in Guinea, Togo, Madagascar, Vanuatu, Kiribati, the CAR and 
Burundi. A range of strategies are used to prevent the involvement of trade unions and 
workers' associations. In the Grenadines, for instance, unions are prevented from accessing 
information and face attempts at corruption or government silence in response to their 
questions. In this first group of ACP countries, the problem remains entirely unresolved. The 
challenge is both to enable trade union involvement and to have unions' views taken into 
account in decision-making and the implementation of development policies. The countries of 
Central (CAR, Burundi) and Western (Togo, Guinea) Africa belonging to this group highlight 
a possible link between a crisis in the national democratic process and a lack of trade union 
and worker association involvement in national policy-making. In a country like Madagascar 
where only 10% of workers belong to trade unions, anti-union practices are widespread and 
the rights of workers' organisations are violated, it is not surprising that trade unions are 
sidelined when it comes to defining and implementing the development strategy. 
 
In Vanuatu, workers' organisations are virtually excluded from decision-making on 
development policy issues. The government is trying to disorientate the trade union 
movement. A number of consultations have taken place with NGOs, but the credibility of 
these is open to doubt as some are subsidised by the government. Likewise in Kiribati, the 
government does not take trade unions into account in national policy-making. The unions 
have not managed to establish a counterbalancing force and no initiative has been taken by the 
authorities. Partnerships with other organisations have remained minimal. 
 
In the Caribbean, generally speaking and with a few exceptions, trade unions are not 
consulted or invited to attend discussions on social and economic issues. At the 25th 
Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in July 2004, the 
Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) delegation called for greater involvement by 
workers' organisations in economic and social policy-making, saying it was time for 
governments to see them as partners rather than obstacles. In Jamaica, trade unions also 
complain of a lack of real constructive dialogue on the development strategy, particularly 
as regards the EPAs, although they are consulted on some economic and social issues. 
 
The Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), the body responsible for 
providing technical advice to Caribbean governments on trade issues, has taken the 
initiative of informing trade unions about negotiations and engaging in dialogue with them 
and the other social partners. The CRNM held a regional workshop on trade and 
employment issues in February 2006, bringing together 60 participants including 
representatives of the social partners in all the CARICOM Member States and 
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representatives from the European Union. A general consensus emerged on the need to 
include and apply the fundamental ILO conventions in trade agreements.  
 
In Togo, there is still little involvement by workers' and other civil society organisations in 
formulating and drawing up development strategies. Since October 2001, when the PRSP 
process was launched, the government, acting under pressure from donors, in particular the 
World Bank, the IMF and the European Union, has been trying to involve the different non-
state actors in the implementation of development policies (PRSPs, EPAs, MDGs). Analysis 
shows that the involvement of civil society organisations and trade unions remains limited. As 
far as trade unions in particular are concerned, involvement has been largely nominal, the 
government showing little real intention of taking their views into account. In most cases, 
unions are only invited to the launch and approval meetings and are not really involved in 
policy-making discussions. This state of affairs derives from the fact that the authorities are 
not yet showing any real willingness to involve non-state actors such as workers' 
organisations in the process of economic development, as recommended by the Cotonou 
Agreements and the development partners. Furthermore, a survey of trade union officers at 
the various centres shows that more often than not, unions do not have the human resources 
and technical and operational capacities needed to take an active role in social dialogue on 
socio-economic issues by formulating suitable sustainable human development strategies that 
take into account workers' concerns on issues relating to employment, decent work and access 
to basic public and social services. These limited capacities are bottlenecks that prevent real 
trade union involvement in drawing up development policies. 
 
That said, the initiatives taken since 2004 by the Workers' Trade Union Confederation of 
Togo (CSTT) and the creation of the Intersyndicale in 2005 have led to a new dynamic in the 
Togolese trade union movement, which is increasingly trying to boost its capacities, 
particularly as regards knowledge of the Cotonou Agreement and its mechanisms. To this 
end, seminars have been organised since September 2005 by the Intersyndicale, a number of 
trade union centres (CSTT) and the Democratic Trade Union Organisation of African 
Workers (ODSTA) in favour of trade unions, with a view to wider dissemination of the 
contents of the Agreement and EPA-related issues. The unions are thus starting to become 
aware of the importance of implementing the EPAs for local people and in particular workers. 
As yet, there is no organised and structured partnership between the authorities and the social 
partners (unions, employers) and other civil society players in relation to the Cotonou 
Agreement and the EPAs. However, with the new dynamic provided by the Intersyndicale, 
alliances could emerge between the trade union movement and the other players in civil 
society on these issues. 
 
B) 2nd group of ACP countries: involvement of trade unions and workers' associations 
but no real consideration of their demands 
 
     The second situation is the situation that prevails in the ACP countries where there is 
involvement by trade unions and workers' associations but in practice their demands and 
observations are not really taken into account when implementing development policies. This 
is the case, for example, in Benin, Burkina Faso, Barbados, Jamaica, Surinam, Ghana, the Fiji 
Islands and Senegal. This group has reached the stage of dialogue and involvement in 
discussions on priorities, but real consideration of trade union and worker association 
demands has still to be negotiated and rounded off in order to prevent the existing dialogue 
from becoming a dialogue of the deaf, which would allow governments to exploit the social 
dialogue for their own purposes. Senegal is well on the way to resolving this problem by 
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means of institutional innovations. It adopted a tripartite national charter on social dialogue in 
2002 and set up a National Social Dialogue Committee (CNDS). This second group illustrates 
a key characteristic of political regimes in many African countries, namely the presence of a 
purely institutional democracy that does not translate into real or tangible means of action. 
 
In Burkina Faso's socio-political context, workers' social rights are respected and there are no 
major obstacles to the freedom of association and action. This framework has encouraged 
union activity in the country, which has seven trade union centres and over 10 autonomous 
and highly active trade unions covering the different sectors of economic activity. Thanks to 
the new guidelines governing implementation of the development strategies recommended by 
donors (Bretton Woods Institutions, UNDP, EU), the participatory framework set up by the 
authorities encourages greater involvement by the various non-state actors. These attempts at 
involving non-state actors are based on programmes implemented as part of poverty reduction 
strategies launched in 1996 with the UNDP and have been continued in the framework of the 
PRSP and MDG processes. It would seem that the various NSA components have been 
involved to a greater or lesser extent in implementing the comprehensive development 
strategies launched by Burkina Faso under the aegis of its development partners. However, 
the trade unions say that they are not very actively involved. They feel as if they are drowning 
in a sea of civil society players and believe that the way the involvement is organised needs to 
be overhauled. Working documents are sent out late, consultations are not well prepared and 
their concerns are not taken into account. Social dialogue is a firmly anchored reality in 
Burkina Faso insofar as it is based on a clear institutional framework that provides for 
different forms of dialogue. According to the unions, the Cotonou Agreement has not been an 
explicit catalyst for social dialogue.  
 
In Mauritius, the National Tripartite Committee meets regularly to discuss the budget, wages 
and other matters. However, only some sectors are involved in preparing and implementing 
national development strategies, in particular education and health. Unions are often denied 
the power of initiative. Not all workers have access to information and those who do, do not 
always have the capacity to use and interpret it. However, a National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC), including trade union and civil society representatives, was set up in April 
2002 with a view to establishing a social dialogue. It has enabled an ongoing and sustained 
dialogue, thereby preserving social harmony. Various reports on road traffic, AIDS and the 
integration of older people have been submitted to the Council. 
 
In the Seychelles, the government regularly consults workers on important issues. However, 
their opinion was not mentioned in the national report compiled by the Seychelles in July 
2002. Sectoral coordination remains inadequate. Trade unions lack the appropriate capacities, 
financial resources, paid officials, etc. which makes it difficult for them to take part in the 
sustainable development platform. 
  
In Guinea, trade union involvement in drawing up development strategies is less obvious. 
This low level of involvement can be attributed to the climate of suspicion that exists between 
the authorities and the workers' organisations and the lack of political will on the 
government's part to involve unions in the different processes for formulating development 
policies. Under pressure from donors, the government has had to involve the unions and 
players in the implementation of the comprehensive development strategies currently under 
way, in particular the PRSPs, EPAs, MDGs and NEPAD, as well as the sectoral development 
strategies.  
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According to most trade unions, their actual involvement in these processes is not all that it 
should be. Analysis of the information gathered from Guinean trade union officers in the 
survey conducted by ODSTA on African trade union involvement and during PRSP and EPA 
training sessions, shows that unions in Guinea are usually only invited to attend strategy 
launch meetings and approval ceremonies, the relevant documents having been drawn up by 
government officials. The authorities do not take any measures to properly organise trade 
union involvement. In general, unions do not have detailed information about the strategies 
and receive the working documents and files later than they should. Invitations to attend 
meetings are also sent out at the last moment. They feel that they are drowning in a sea of 
civil society players and believe that their concerns are not being taken into account.  
 
One final point: the Ghana TUC welcomes the Cotonou Agreement's acknowledgement of the 
importance of non-state actors but laments the non-binding nature of the consultative 
measures implemented by the agreements. Involvement of non-state actors is only possible if 
the state wants to do so since the agreements give the state the power to decide whether or not 
it is appropriate to enter into dialogue with non-state actors. This means that the government 
can ignore trade unions on crucial issues. However, the Ghana TUC has observed some 
modest improvements over the past few years, although these cannot be directly attributed to 
the Cotonou Agreements. 
 
The Ghana TUC thus acknowledges that there is a growing trend towards consultation of 
workers' organisations in the process of formulating the national development strategy and the 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS). Within this framework, it has made a series of 
proposals to the government with a view to promoting an active employment policy centred 
on creating decent jobs, increasing wages by setting a national subsistence wage, introducing 
tax exemption for low wages and reducing income inequalities. Specific proposals have also 
been made to use the informal sector to help to create jobs. The Ghana TUC has submitted its 
proposals to the government and published them in its newsletter, which has a very wide 
circulation. 
 
However, the situation remains very unsatisfactory because the organisations are only getting 
involved late on in the process, which allows them little time to agree on a position. 
Moreover, the information on which they base their position is often inadequate. The 
government does not involve non-state actors as a matter of course, although they were 
consulted and involved in formulating the National Trade Policy (NTP) and the Trade Sector 
Support Programme (TSSP).  
 
 
C) 3rd group of ACP countries: involvement of trade unions with real consideration of 
their demands  
 
     Finally, the third situation is the situation that prevails in the ACP countries where there is 
real involvement of the trade unions and workers' associations and where their demands are 
taken into account in policy implementation. This is the case in Barbados, where trade unions 
are respected and take part in negotiations on trade and government policy. This third group, 
which also includes Senegal, has already reached the stages of trade union involvement and 
real consideration of union demands in policy-making. However, ongoing caution and effort 
are still required to retain this power of initiative and prevent any decline in the situation. 
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Trade union life is very dynamic in these countries. Senegal, for example, has a dozen trade 
union centres representing workers and four representing employers. As in Togo, most are 
affiliated to international trade unions. The unions are very active in the various sectors of 
economic activity, which makes them a strong force in the country's social, economic and 
political life. The involvement of Senegalese unions in the process of formulating and 
drawing up development strategies is better structured than in some other countries in the sub-
region like Togo and Guinea. This reflects greater awareness on the part of the non-state 
actors as well as a political willingness by the authorities to establish social dialogue in the 
country's economic and social life.  
 
Senegal is firmly committed to implementing social dialogue, as is shown by the fact that a 
number of consultation and negotiation structures and consultation committees have been 
created. In 2002, the country also introduced a National Tripartite Charter on Social Dialogue, 
a social regulation instrument offering a framework for discussion and action that allows the 
state and the social partners to promote social dialogue and social protection by implementing 
various consultation, negotiation and information exchange mechanisms. The Charter aims, 
amongst other things, to: (i) expand social dialogue at all levels by strengthening the 
institutional framework in which it takes place to further enhance its efficiency; (ii) strengthen 
social dialogue mechanisms. The Charter, which entered into force in March  2003, applies to 
all sectors of the economy, both public and private, and to the informal sector. There is also a 
National Social Dialogue Committee (CNDS). At its first session in November 2005, various 
subjects were addressed, including: "Social dialogue: challenges and prospects", "Social 
dialogue and social protection", "Social security of government employees", "Recurrent crises 
in sectors such as education and health: diagnosing the problem and finding a solution" and 
"Social dialogue and changes in the world of work". 
 
Rules on worker conduct have been drawn up in the framework of the Senegalese National 
Charter on Social Dialogue. Employees must, amongst other things: (i) help to find suitable 
solutions to problems that prevent the company from running smoothly, namely absenteeism, 
slackness, low productivity and incompetence; (ii) help to improve the working environment 
and conditions (health and safety) and the social climate (harmonious social relations within 
the company); (iii) alert their employer when they know of serious and imminent situations or 
hazards that could have a worrying effect on working conditions or the social climate within 
the company. 
 
Given the political, social and economic context in Senegal, there would appear to be more 
active involvement of non-state actors (NSAs) in the various development strategies. The 
Cotonou Agreements have used this favourable environment to give the NSAs a shot in the 
arm. However, within this process other civil society organisations have been more dynamic 
than trade unions in exploiting the opportunities offered by the new cooperation framework 
between the EU and the ACP countries.  
 
7 – Access to development cooperation resources  
 
    Most ACP trade unions are not aware of these funds and thus have had no access whatever 
to development cooperation resources. They are unaware of the procedures for accessing them  
and the mechanisms for requesting and using them. This goes to show that information is both 
inaccessible and very poorly circulated due to competition for development cooperation 
resources. In Ghana, for example, the TUC has very limited access to development 
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cooperation resources and the signing of the Cotonou Agreements has not made the process 
any easier. Information on available development cooperation resources is difficult to obtain, 
the conditions for accessing these resources are unclear and not being made any clearer while 
the conditions of use are too strict and not adapted to trade union capacities. 
 
Further, in Rwanda, access to development cooperation financing channels for development 
projects remains complicated for workers' organisations, which do not yet have enough 
information on the conditions for accessing this funding. The specific problems encountered 
when searching for funding for projects to improve living and working conditions for local 
populations are a lack of adequate information on all available development programmes and 
their access criteria, insufficiently transparent and undeclared access conditions and 
government reluctance regarding direct funding for organisations that are independent of the 
political authorities. The criteria for managing these resources are similar to those applying to 
the government, whereas the workers' organisations do not have the same means of action as 
the government. The criteria are therefore too strict and not proportionate to the capacities of 
trade unions. 
 
In practical terms, accessing development cooperation resources remains largely impossible 
given trade unions' limited resources. They do not have enough information and human 
resources to carry out vital tasks at minimum cost. Also, the criteria for accessing and using 
funds are very restrictive and trade unions, with the capacities at their disposal, are generally 
not in a position to meet such stringent requirements.  
 
8 – Trade union analysis of EPA challenges and proposed action 
 
 
The new Economic Partnership Agreement, the effect of which will be to liberalise trade in 
both directions, aims to encourage the ACP countries to move towards more dynamic and 
sustainable growth. The EPAs could potentially result in far-reaching changes. For this 
reason, it is necessary as a matter of urgency to better understand the challenges associated 
with the agreement and determine what approaches should be taken and what resources 
mobilised to limit its negative impact on living and working conditions. EU/ACP cooperation 
is assumed to be an effective instrument: the trade unions see the Cotonou Agreement as a 
means of helping not only to enhance the role and place of civil society and trade unions in 
drawing up and implementing development policies but also of boosting economic growth, 
employment, inflation control and the access of populations to basic goods and services. 
However, socio-economic clauses need to be implemented within the EPAs in order to 
improve the respect for workers' rights, tackle poverty and ensure sustainable development.  
 
The concerns of all ACP countries centre around the liberalisation of trade and the all-out 
integration into the global market advocated by the Cotonou Agreement. They are concerned 
that their economies, still geared towards a colonial system of complementarity (i.e. as 
suppliers of raw materials), cannot stand up to the competition-based system (intra-industry 
trade) that drives modern global trade. As ACP unions see it, when you put two unequally 
matched fighters in a ring, freedom of action becomes the stronger man's weapon. They think 
that EU/ACP cooperation will benefit the EU alone if the problems raised are not properly 
taken into account. Some sectors, such as basic goods, small-scale industry, agriculture and 
crafts, need to be protected by adding special mechanisms to the Cotonou Agreement. 
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   Having financed and conducted a study into the impact of the regional EPA on its economy, 
Benin can confirm these general concerns. The study notes: (1) an erosion of protection (5% 
average drop in the nominal protection rate and 9% drop in the actual protection rate). This is 
resulting in a loss of competitiveness in all sectors of Benin's economy; (2) a 45.69% 
reduction in the overall offer of local products over the 12 years the EPA has been in place 
(i.e. an annual reduction of around 4%); (3) an increase of over 28% in imports from the EU 
and no notable effect on Benin's exports to the EU; (4) a drop in imports from ECOWAS 
(3.93%) and the rest of the world (3.49%); (5) a total loss in government revenue of around 
FCFA 175 billion resulting from a drastic fall in customs revenue (down FCFA 181.3 billion) 
and a slight increase in tax revenue from VAT (up FCFA 6.441 billion); (6) a general drop in 
domestic goods prices (FCFA 264.3 billion). The latter could result in a surplus and benefit 
consumers provided that retailers and distributors do not cream off the margins linked to the 
drop in customs tariffs. 
      
   Under these conditions, the unions seriously doubt whether the full market system 
advocated by the Agreement can be an effective development strategy for the countries in 
question. West African trade unionists, meeting in Sally, Senegal, in July 2005, took as their 
basis a trade union proposal made by the Beninese confederations in 2003, maintaining that 
negotiation of the EPA with the EU should continue (i.e. the opposite to the Stop EPA 
campaign launched by the NGOs). West African trade unionists therefore wish to: (a) slow 
the pace of the negotiations to give themselves time to assimilate the scope of the agreements; 
(b) involve the unions in the tripartite EPA negotiations at both regional and local level; (c) 
step up regional integration and the movement of goods and people; (d) take account of the 
region's need to determine trade and investment policies itself; (e) take proper account of the 
international labour standards and conventions set out in Article 50 of the Agreement with a 
view to guaranteeing the protection of workers' rights and take account of gender-related 
issues; (f) implement common sectoral policies, in particular on agriculture; (g) preserve 
nationally and regionally the rights granted to the Least Developed Countries; (h) bolster the 
capacities of national and regional economic operators; (i) identify and exclude certain 
sensitive products from the EPAs; (j) negotiate compensation for loss of revenue; (k) invest 
more in the development of infrastructure. 
 
The Senegalese trade unions adopted a critical position towards the EPAs, which the EU and 
the ACP countries see as bridges by which countries like Senegal can enter the global 
economy. Overall, they see the expected effects of EPAs on the national economy, 
employment and the living conditions' of workers as harmful (access to public services and 
social services increasingly provided by privatised companies). The unions view the EPAs as 
instruments of unbridled trade liberalisation of the global economy, benefiting the WTO, the 
Bretton Woods Institutions and multinational companies at the expense of workers and trade 
unions. Hence implementing these new instruments would weaken the trade union movement.  
 
In the case of Mauritius, trade liberalisation in the framework of the WTO, is compromising 
future competitiveness since as a result of its production costs the country cannot compete 
with the large emerging countries such as China with which it does not have a quota system 
or preferential tariffs. The textile sector is expected to shrink by 15% in 2005-2006 (a loss of 
1.5% of GDP) and by a further 8% in 2007 (0.5% of GDP). Mauritius must therefore turn 
towards other production sectors with a high value added, such as horticulture. However, the 
country still seems very far from implementing such a strategy and its connections with the 
global market remain inadequate, although rapid progress has been made possible thanks to 
the development of ICT. 
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In Togo, the trade unions see the EPAs as a powerful instrument in favour of liberal 
liberalisation and an driver of globalisation that benefits EU countries more than the ACP 
countries. They acknowledge that the EPA process governing relations between Europe and 
the ACP countries from 2008 onwards will have a number of positive effects, but in general 
they believe that these are outweighed by the negative implications for the Togolese and 
ECOWAS economies. The positive effects identified by the unions include: encouragement of 
regional economic integration, increased competitiveness and increased volume of trade 
performed by national export companies. However, the unions think that the negative impacts 
will cancel out the anticipated positive effects. According to them, implementation of the 
EPAs will lead to company closures, job losses, an increase in trade deficits and reduced 
access to public and social services, in short a decline in working conditions, a deterioration in 
living standards and an increase in poverty. The economic sectors that will benefit from the 
EPAs are those in which foreign capital predominates and which are linked to export sectors 
(phosphate, cotton, coffee, cocoa). However, these sectors, which are undergoing 
restructuring, account for only a tiny proportion of workers. Furthermore, the division of 
value added within these companies works to the detriment of workers. Given these 
conditions, the unions believe that the strategies to be recommended for raising the country's 
level of development should focus on the agricultural sector and social and public services. 
 
 
Ghana, like most ACP countries, lacks the autonomy to decide on the direction, order and 
speed of the changes to be made as part of a development strategy. Although the ACP 
countries are 'in the driving seat', they must nonetheless comply with the guidelines set by the 
main development cooperation partners, namely the IMF, the World Bank and the European 
Union. It is clear that policies aimed at trade liberalisation and unregulated competition are 
not beneficial to the poor and vulnerable. Trade liberalisation is a subject of major 
controversy due to the imbalances between the profits and costs that it generates. The profits 
are concentrated in the hands of a small proportion of the population whereas the costs are 
borne by the most vulnerable. Imports of cheap products from China and the EU have led to 
the closure of many small production units. Trade liberalisation and insufficient resources to 
successfully perform an appropriate industrial policy have forced companies to engage in 
defensive competitiveness by cutting back on labour costs and health and safety regulations. 
 
Trade liberalisation has also tended to make Ghana a commercial society in which imported 
products occupy an increasingly important place. Production systems have been severely 
affected by this change, resulting in high levels of unemployment, particularly amongst young 
people in towns and cities. According to the Ghana TUC, it is vital to maintain a non-
reciprocal relationship between the ACP countries and the countries of the EU. The EPAs 
must also safeguard the right to protect vital but non-competitive ACP sectors. Any system of 
complete and reciprocal liberalisation between the ACP and EU countries would be a disaster 
for the former and must be avoided. Safety clauses must also be provided allowing the ACP 
countries to raise their customs duties in the event of a massive influx of imported products in 
order to re-establish a balance. The appropriate use of such protective customs mechanisms 
could encourage the development of growth poles for future export revenue and also stimulate 
job creation. Moreover, the new sanitary and phytosanitary rules contained in the EPAs open 
the door to new forms of protectionism that would limit the access of ACP products to the EU 
markets. Finally, the loss of government revenue resulting from trade liberalisation must be 
compensated for so that it does not adversely affect government anti-poverty programmes.  
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9 – Assessing the needs of the trade union movement 
 
 
The Cotonou Agreements offer real opportunities to bolster trade unions' capacities. The 
European Commission has pledged to expand the Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) and 
encourage shared assessments with partner countries and regions to help them better select 
priorities and mobilise external assistance. Thus, within the framework of the thematic 
programming and country and regional programming, the Commission will support actions to 
integrate decent work into the national and regional development and poverty reduction 
strategies, enhance the capacities of administrations and civil society organisations, involve 
the social partners and civil society in the development and poverty reduction strategies and 
step up external assistance for social adjustments in the third countries and regions engaged in 
trade liberalisation. In this context, the Commission has pledged to work with civil society 
and to foster social dialogue. To achieve this, it will support efforts to strengthen the technical 
capacities of the social partners and civil society and to develop institutions, mechanisms and 
practices to facilitate and bolster the social dialogue process, both bipartite and tripartite. 
 
In view of this, it is important for trade unions to identify their own needs. The needs and 
priorities of trade unions are very similar across the ACP countries. Their needs are centred 
around four interdependent areas, namely information, intellectual and technical training, 
organisation and the improvement of institutional capacities.  
 
As regards information, the unions are demanding a more efficient information system that 
will give them greater knowledge of the practical and political procedures associated with the 
Cotonou Agreement, which several union members say they know in basic and general terms. 
The intellectual and technical training needs of trade unions and their members are 
concentrated in the areas of globalisation (challenges of the globalised economy), macro-
economic indicators (meanings, interpretations and limits), international trade, NEPAD and 
the WTO (institution, rules and modus operandi). The aim is to acquire a capacity for 
assessment and negotiation with state and international actors who generally sideline trade 
unions from discussions under the pretext that they have no understanding of international 
trade. As regards organisational shortcomings and needs, the emphasis is on creating (or 
strengthening) national, sub-regional and international synergies between trade unions. 
Consequently, the last union demand expresses the need to strengthen the institutional 
capacities of unions at national and regional level. 
 
     To this end, the priority ACP trade union demands are to: (1) enhance basic knowledge 
among trade union officers; (2) expand training on trade agreements, particularly for general 
secretaries and grass-roots activists; (3) identify individuals with trade-related knowledge and 
skills and help them to pass on that knowledge; (4) support a concrete lobbying plan on the 
issue of labour; (5) have the option of issuing publications; (6) have the financial support 
needed to undertake analyses and disseminate information amongst grass-roots activists; (7) 
enhance the participatory framework for trade unions and civil society in the negotiation 
process; (8) improve analyses of the informal sector and protection of informal sector 
workers. 
 
According to the Ghana TUC, for example, workers' organisations have a good knowledge of 
the contents of the WTO and Cotonou Agreements and the challenges of globalisation. 
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However, the unions have inadequate human and financial resources when it comes to 
assessments, counter-assessments and negotiation. This is the result of a substantial reduction 
in the public sector workforce, de-industrialisation and informalisation, which have 
considerably reduced trade union membership and, consequently, resources.   
 
Support for NSA capacity development, as provided for in the Cotonou Agreements, has not 
been forthcoming and the conditions governing eligibility for these resources are too 
restrictive for trade unions. Unions also have major difficulties accessing information on the 
existence of resources and the procedures for obtaining them. Another cause for regret is the 
competition between non-state organisations, whether NGOs, trade unions or others, for 
access to resources, which does nothing to facilitate the circulation of information. 
 
In Guinea, in addition to the general context, which is not particularly conducive to social 
dialogue due to institutional weaknesses, government mistrust and poor dissemination of 
information, the trade union officers consulted acknowledge that workers' organisations have 
technical, organisational and operational weaknesses that represent obstacles to a real 
involvement in implementing the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs. They believe that they 
lack the expertise and real capacities to draw up alternative development strategies in the 
social and economic fields.  
 
According to trade unions in Rwanda, workers' organisations have a very inadequate 
knowledge of the contents of the Cotonou Agreement, the WTO rules and the challenges 
posed by the development of the globalised economy. Their capacity to assess, form counter-
proposals and negotiate is currently non-existent. Regional cooperation amongst ACP 
workers' organisations in terms of organising themselves, working together and developing 
their expertise is still at an early stage and the level of international cooperation with the trade 
union movement in the North is also inadequately developed. Consequently, the priorities for 
developing capacities that will enable workers' organisations to play a full role in defining and 
implementing the development strategy are as follows: promote trade union expertise by 
recruiting and training the right number and kind of trade union officers; promote and 
strengthen trade unions' institutional and organisational performance; promote and strengthen 
grass-roots trade unionism for the benefit not only of workers but also of the local 
populations by means of socio-economic projects; promote and strengthen the financial 
autonomy of trade unions by means of projects that generate income and provide services for 
workers. 
 
Finally, alongside the trade unions there are other kinds of associations, not all of which are 
recognised as NGOs by the international institutions, which are also concerned about the 
problems posed by the dominant economic and financial system in respect of human rights, 
the environment and so forth. The trade union movement can help to rally these forces and so 
create strong relationships that will support the changes it is advocating. It is therefore 
important to encourage and help these trade unions and civil society organisations to structure 
themselves more effectively, build networks, make themselves more representative and 
develop their capacity for analysis. 
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